THE  MODERN  RATIONALIST

.A recent headline from the now-online-only Weekly World
                   News reads: “Alien Bible Translated:  Extra terrestrials follow
            the teachings of Oprah Winfrey.” Apparently, Oprah’s popularity has now reached astronomical proportions. In another issue, headlines read: ‘Scientists Reveal Lawyers and Leeches Have Identical Genetic Makeup.” Now, as much as some of us would like to think this is true, we still might want to say something in defense of the leeches.

But seriously, when we ask whether or not anyone should believe these and other similar stories, we are assuming that there are better and worse ways to interpret and act on information. We often find these stories ridiculous because they cannot possibly correspond to what we experience in everyday life without giving rise to a number of obvious contradictions and inconsistencies. Quite simply, they are inconsistent with the logical structure of our methods and means for explaining events in the world. And so we look upon  them with a certain amount of reservation and disdain for their epistemic irresponsibility. We doubt their truth, and we believe we have good reason to doubt them. In other words, we are skeptical of them.

Although it is not difficult to be skeptical of the truth of such events, I believe it is important to ask ourselves what it means to be skeptical today; by tracing skepticism’s rich ancestry. Once we have an understanding of the ancient roots of skepticism, we will see a clear and obvious path to the evolution of scientific reasoning - specifically, scientific methodology, criteria, power of explanation, and epistemic responsibility.

First of all, contrary to what many believe, the term skeptic does not mean “doubter.” The Greek term skeptikos means “inquirer” or “investigator”. Originally, skepticism was referred to as Pyrrhonism - so named after its founder Pyrrho of Elis. When we look at the history of ancient skepticism, we can see three predominant periods; the pre-Academic (which flourished after the death of Alexander the Great in 323 BCE), the Academic (which lasted into the second century CE), and the post-Academic (which flourished after the death of Christ, lasting into the third century CE).

The Pre-Academic Skeptics

On the western side of the Greek Peloponnesus in a city named Elis, the philosopher Pyrrho was born around 360 BCE. Like Socrates, Pyrrho never kept a systematic account of his philosophy in writing. Most of what we have of Pyrrho today comes from the writings of his star pupil, Timon.  Instead of elaborating a complex written system, Pyrrho offered his followers an agoge- an exemplary way of living. Though not much is known about the specific life-style Pyrrho professed, we do know that it involved living peacefully according to the laws and customs of the state.

Although this might not seem a terribly radical lifestyle, to fully appreciate Pyrrho’s contribution to skepticism and epistemic responsibility, we need to keep in mind that the central goal of much ancient Greek philosophy was happiness, or eudaimonia. But this was no ordinary or base form of happiness. It involved a contentment of mind in the conduct of life. From Pyrrho’s student Timon, we learn that if a person is to be happy, he must ask himself three questions and answer them to the best of his ability:

1) What is the stuff of things?

Pyrrho’s response is that our five senses and all proposed metaphysical theories (such as those held by the Pre-Socratic philosophers) contradict each other when they refer to the nature or essence of things. For example, when we taste honey, is the sweetness in the honey or is it in us? Certain foods may smell sweet but have a bitter taste. An object may look smooth but in fact be quite rough to the touch. Our senses, then, contradict one another when we attempt to determine the nature of things. And so, too, do the metaphysical theories about the nature of all of reality. The prime component is air. Or is it water? Or motion? Or atoms? Etc.

2) In what relation do we stand to things around us?

When it comes to conflicting theories concerning the inner nature of things, Pyrrho suggests that we refrain from siding one way or the other because either is equally plausible or implausible. And so we must engage in epoche. Epoche is the suspension of assent or belief. It is the withholding of belief in the face of equally plausible or implausible claims regarding the true nature of things.

Like Socrates, Pyrrho explicitly recognized his own ignorance and acknowledged akatalepsia, or lack of absolute knowledge concerning reality. In light of this realization, Pyrrho assumed aphasia, or quietude concerning the absolute nature of things. In other words, since one cannot determine one way or the other which metaphysical doctrines are true and which are false, one should choose neither and remain silent, for nothing true can be said concerning the nature of things. This did not mean, however, that a Pyrrhonian simply remained quiet regarding non-metaphysical issues. On the contrary, the skeptic was very interested and active in practical affairs.

3) What is the result, as far as our happiness is concerned, of this metaphysical detachment?

To Pyrrho, this detachment of belief (or epoche) led to a state of ataraxia, or tranquility of mind. By abstaining from fanaticism concerning matters that apparently cannot be proven, we can become content with living peacefully among our experiences without the desire to know the true nature of reality. Pyrrho’s indifference was directed mainly at the dogmatic and fanatical views of philosophers. Rather than trying to shed or numb his ordinary human feelings, he exercised nature (like death and illness) that all humans must meet. This notion of moderation comes from the Greek metriopatheia, which means that we can control our passions when confronted with natural forces beyond our control.

As an illustration of metriopatheia, consider a story about Pyrrho at sea during a very bad storm. While the passengers were cowering in fear, Pyrrho maintained a level of calm. When the storm seemed to be at its worst, Pyrrho pointed out to the passengers a small pig that was eating quite contentedly while the storm raged around it. It is the calmness of the pig, said Pyrrho, that signifies wisdom. Since the storm is a force of nature beyond one’s control, it is senseless to let our fears get the best of us. Nothing can be done about it. For most of us, nature is sometimes too powerful and we have natural emotional response to that power. Given our current understanding of our genetic, biological, and emotional influences, irrational responses to events beyond our control seem perfectly normal. However, the use of metriopatheia involves a conscious and rational understanding that human beings’ responses will not affect the outcome of any natural occurrence beyond their control. In other words, wishing for something does not make it so. In fact, overly emotional human response could worsen a situation by clouding our reasoning abilities. This does not mean we are going to act rationally in a desperate situation. On the contrary, some of the most level-headed people can become extremely irrational during times of crisis. So mastering something like metriopatheia requires considerable time and discipline. In times of crisis, it would be favourably to be cool-headed clear thinkers who act accordingly. It should come as no surprise, then, that a skeptic is always made and never born. It takes considerable time and discipline to recognize and accept of the world and to use this information (or lack thereof) in a beneficial and practical way. This is not an easy thing to do. Think for a moment of how different things could be in the Middle East today if world leaders could accept and apply some of these central Pyrrhonian ideas.

The -Academic Skeptics

After the death of Socrates, Plato began a school of philosophy in Athens called The Academy. In the third and second centuries BCE after Plato’s death, The Academy became involved once again with skepticism. Academics who took over The Academy continued the tradition of doubt and inquiry made  popular by Plato’s predecessor, Socrates. Like both Socrates and Pyrrho, the Academics developed the distinction between the appearance of things or phenomena and the inner constitution of things. This distinction between appearance and reality became extremely important; it continued to emphasize separation between metaphysical matters- matters that could not be resolved by any rational or empirical means - and commonsense matters, matters that one must deal with on a day-to-day practical level. Notice how similar this is to the way in which modern science deals with information today; science is generally pragmatic - if it works and is communally agreeable, then it is provisionally warranted.   Most scientists are not in the metaphysics business. The influence of this type of pragmatic attitude can be traced directly to the Pyrrhonians.

There are at least two very important elements that the Academic Skeptics introduced into skepticism:

1) The first involves consistent and systematic attacks directed toward specific dogmatic position, like the metaphysics of Plato and the philosophy of the Stoics. The term dogmatic comes from the Greek dogmatikos, meaning doctrinaire thinker. A dogmatist is someone  who hold dogmata - not merely casual beliefs but theoretical doctrines, tenets, or principles - to be true. The Academics would direct their attack at specific schools of thought while the pre-Academics were more concerned with living a peaceful, happy life.

2) The Academics also introduced a detailed doctrine for living among the phenomena of everyday life. They developed rules and a vocabulary for dealing and interacting with their experiences.

The first of the great Academic skeptics was Arcesilaus, who was born approximately 315 BCE and died around 240 BCE. He became head of Plato’s Academy and immediately rejected Plato’s metaphysical doctrines. Arcesilaus also focused his criticism on the Stoics. The Stoics believed that there were certain perceptions that are self-evidently true and that cannot be doubted. The Stoics believed that these perceptions were so strong that they would force the mind to assent to them, and by so doing one could grasp the inner nature of things in the universe. But Arcesilaus maintained that knowledge of the inner nature of things is not possible without first determining absolute criteria by which to make such determinations. The problem of establishing a criterion or set of criteria from which we can justify metaphysical beliefs has been around for millennia.  The problem has, to this day, centered on our conceptual and intellectual limitations for devising or discovering absolute criteria. Consider the following thought experiment involving gold in a dark room.

The Gold in the Dark Room Thought              Experiment

This thought experiment involves a story in which various people find themselves in a totally dark room. They are told that there are various objects throughout the room made of different metals;: iron, lead, steel, silver, bronze, brass etc., but that only one object is made of gold. They are then asked to move around the room and pick up the various objects to determine when they have found the gold object. The analogy here is very simple.  Positing metaphysical theories is like trying to find the golden object in the dark room. Even if we had the golden object in our hands, we would not know it because we lack the capacity to make such discernment. We may believe metaphysical theories that are ultimately true. However, we have no way of knowing they are true because we lack the criteria by which to make the discernment.

And so, just as Socrates maintained, the Pyrrhonians, too, stated that we must admit our ignorance on such matters. The great value of this realization and  admission, of course, is that we are humbled by acknowledging that we are limited in our knowledge. Once we make this realization we can better deal with matters that affect us more directly - such as commonsense practical affairs and eventually, scientific investigations. Epistemic humility attained in this manner is a responsible starting point in the acquisition of information, and such humility is entirely egalitarian. Reflecting upon one’s ignorance in a responsible manner applies to every human on this planet. It cuts through any and all barriers - naturally evolved or culturally created. This is not to say that such a realization means that metaphysical matters are not important. However, the very important distinction here is the conscious recognition and separation between metaphysical matters - the truth of which we currently cannot determine - and commonsense (and eventually, scientific) matters, the truth of which we can determine, at least in a tentative, communal, and practical way. Historically, I think one of the greatest legacies the ancient skeptics have given us is an understanding of the overall epistemic framework in which we attempt to understand the world and ourselves. It is a very mature and well conceptualized metaview of knowledge because it looks at what is involved in everyone’s attempt to understand the world. I believe this is one of our species’ greatest cultural and conceptual accomplishments - the separation of BIG T (metaphysical) Truth from little t (commonsense and scientific) truth.

The Post-Academic Skeptics

There are two post-Academic skeptics whose works we shall consider. Aenesidemus and Sextus Empiricus. Aenesidemus produced what are called the tropoi, or ten modes of skepticism, that put equally plausible beliefs in conflict with each other. These became powerful tools that very effectively allowed a skeptic to criticize any metaphysical doctrine. They ranged from the differences of perceptions between different species to the cultural differences that exist between humans.

[When we] have established that all things are relative, we are plainly left with the conclusion that we shall not be able to state what is the nature of each of the objects in its own real purity, but only what nature it appears to possess in its relative character. Hence it follows that we must suspend judgement concerning the real nature of the objects. (Sextus Empiricus 1967. 83)

But the skeptics did not simply criticize the dogmatic views of others. They developed a means of dealing with day-to-day practical affairs.

The Practical Criterion

Arguably, the greatest of all works on ancient skepticism is Sextus Empiricus’s Outline of Pyrrhonism. According to Sextus, after the skeptic has doubted the legitimacy of the absolute truth of the many various metaphysical theories, one may rightly ask how the skeptic function in day-to-day life. You would think that if the skeptic continues to doubt the very things that attempt to provide an understanding of the nature of his experiences, he would be left in a state of catatonia - that is, the skeptic would cease to move or to function in any society (and this is how some ancient historians, like Diogenes Laertius, have wrongly caricatured the ancient skeptics). But Pyrrhonian skeptics did manage to function within society - in fact, they functioned very well and in a contended manner. How did they achieve this? Very simply - the skeptic acquiesces to the appearances. The skeptic “goes along”  with the appearances, neither affirming nor doubting the true nature of them. Sextus has listed four main aspects that aid the skeptic in acquiescing to the appearance. These four aspects have collectively been called the Practical Criterion:

1) The guidance of nature: the skeptic is guided by the natural human capacity for perception and thought - in other words, he uses  his senses and mental faculties to aid in continued survival. Objects seem to fall downward, fire seems to be quite hot, water seems quite wet, etc.

2) The constraint of bodily drives : there are certain drives that the skeptic satisfies - hunger leads him to eat, thirst leads him to drink, sexual desire to procreate, etc.

3) The tradition of laws and customs: the skeptic keeps the rules, observing the conduct of life and pieties of his society. Unless living as a hermit, we have to determine how it is we wish to get along (or not) with one another, so there emerges the need for rules.

4) Instruction in the arts : the skeptic practices an art or profession - in Sextus’s own case it was medicine - so that he can contribute to society as a whole. Some seem more gifted than others for specific types of activities. Fostering those abilities would be consistent with acquiescing to the appearances.

Notice how these criteria utilize the skeptic’s acquiescence to the appearance in order to establish a pragmatic understanding of human experience. Unlike the dogmatist, the skeptic does not hold any particular metaphysical beliefs as either true or false. When confronted with problems within the experience, the skeptic does not sway from one extreme to the other but suspends belief as to their true nature while maintaining a level of moderation.

Like Socrates, the Pyrrhonians were extremely adept at agitating those dogmatist who were convinced of their metaphysical beliefs. Socrates likened himself to a gadfly who bothered the self-satisfied Athenians.  The Pyrrhonians described their views as a laxative that was flushed out with all the rest of the waste. Today, some would call such people pains in the ass. A good skeptic today is, above all, epistemically responsible and only becomes a pain in the ass to someone who is unwilling to entertain the possibility of alternative beliefs. Like Socrates, Pyrrho,  Anesidemus, etc., skeptics are good for any society. The attitude of those who are overly dogmatic in their beliefs may directly lead to actions that have harmful effects on  other members of a society - especially when stated in the form of a false dichotomy like : “Either you are with us, or you are against us (with the terrorists): (G.W.Bush). Once we start to understand the framework within which we attain and exercise beliefs, we can better deal with conflicting viewpoints and ideas. In order to be a good critical thinker (or pain in the ass), one needs to be properly skeptical. Proper skepticism lies somewhere between blind acceptance and absolute skepticism. The former requires little (or no) critical analysis while the latter is skeptical to the point of belief suspension on practically everything.

Proper skepticism, then, requires a commonsense acceptance of an environment in which one develop concepts, ideas, behavior, etc. Philosophers sometimes refer to this as hypothetical realism. This position maintain a very basic framework of experience. It presupposes a field of experience that includes things like people, animals, plants, stars, planets, galaxies, etc. In commonsense terms, we would call this the world and/or the universe. Unless future evidence warrants concern, a good skeptic treats these things as though they exist separately from one’s thinking about them - that is, at the commonsense level of perception. In other words, skeptics acquiesce to the appearances. Science then allow us to extend far beyond this commonsense perception of the world to see things never before possible. What, then, should we be skeptical about? Generally speaking, we should be skeptical about the various ways in which we make claims about different aspects of our world. And we need to be especially skeptical toward those who make absolute claims about the very nature of our world.
For the onus of responsibility always lies with those making the claims. Remember Carl Sagan’s advice about extraordinary claims requiring extraordinary evidence.

But if there is no absolute criterion (or set of criteria) that we can establish with certainty, how do we distinguish good ideas from bad ones? In other words, what is our measuring stick? What can provide us with the ability to discern between good arguments and bad ones? At any given time in human evolution, we can only be expected to utilize the languages and modes of communication and expression available to us. This brute fact is called historical facticity. For example, Aristotle could not have discussed gene therapy just as Newton could not have discussed downloading information from the Internet. Right now, we cannot discuss ways in which future generations will describe various aspects of their world. This is simply because scientific knowledge is gradual and cumulative - we see as far as we do now because we stand on the shoulders of the world’s greatest thinkers from the past and add to their cumulative effort. The measuring sticks we use today to distinguish good ideas or arguments from bad ones involve various rules of reasoning and logic assisted in relevant ways by the various sciences. We have established agreed-upon rules, which are impartial and fair to all, in an effort to establish universality. As skeptics, we have an obligation to continue to establish universal rules of reasoning in an effort to hold people accountable not only for their beliefs through epistemic responsibility but, most importantly, for their actions that may be harmful to others. We have a great tradition of ancient thought to thank for this. One of the driving principles of all modern skeptics today resonates from the collective works of the ancient Pyrrhonians and may be summed up in the following way: think responsibly, act accordingly.

(Courtesy: Skeptical Inquirer- May/June,2009)