Necessity of a new approach
I shall be asked that if the Constituent Assembly is not the correct approach, what is the alternative? I know I shall be confronted with such a question. But I am confident in my view that if the Communal Question has become difficult of solution it is not because it is insoluble, nor because we had not yet employed the machinery of Constituent Assembly. It has become insoluble because the approach to it is fundamentally wrong. The defect in the present approach is that it proceeds by methods instead of by principles. The principle is that there is no principle. There is only a series of methods. If one method fails another is tried. It is this swing from one method to another which has made the Communal Problem a jig-saw puzzle. There being no principle there is no guide to tell why a particular method has failed. There being no principle there is no assurance that the new method will succeed.
The attempts at the solution of the Communal Problem are either in the nature of a coward’s plan to cow tow to the bully or of bully’s plan to dictate to the weak. Whenever a community grows powerful and demands certain political advantages, concessions are made to it to win its goodwill. There is no judicial examination of its claim; no judgement on merits. The result is that there are no limits to demands and there are no limits to concessions. A start is made with a demand for separate electorate for a minority. It is granted. It is followed by a demand for a separate electorate for a community irrespective of the fact whether it is a minority or majority. That is granted. A demand is made for separate representation on a population basis. That is conceded. Next, a claim is made for weightage in representation. That is granted. It is followed by a demand for statutory majority over other minorities with the right for the majority to retain separate electorates. This is granted. This is followed by a demand that the majority rule of another community is intolerable, and therefore without prejudice to its rights to maintain majority rule over other minorities, the majority of the offending community should be reduced to equality. Nothing can be more absurd than this policy of eternal appeasement. It is a policy of limitless demand followed by endless appeasement.
Frankly, I don’t blame the community that indulges in this strategy. It indulges in it because it has found that it pays, it pursues it because there are no principles to fix the limits and it believes that more could be legitimately asked and would be easily given. On the other hand, there is a community economically poor, socially degraded, educationally backward and which is exploited, oppressed and tyrannized without shame and without remorse, disowned by society, unowned by Government and which has security for protection and no guarantee for justice, fair play and equal opportunity. Such a community is told that it can have no safeguards, not because it has no case for safeguards but only because the bully on whom the bill of rights is presented thinks that because the community is not politically organized to have sanctions behind its demand he can successfully bluff.
All this differential treatment is due to the fact that there are no principles, which are accepted as authoritative and binding on those who are parties to the Communal Question. The absence of principles has another deleterious effect. It has made impossible for public opinion to play its part. The public only knows methods and notes that one method has failed another is being suggested. It does not know why one method has failed and why another is said to be likely to succeed. The result is that the public, instead of being mobilized to force obstinate and recalcitrant parties to see sense and reason, are only witnessing the discussions of Communal Questions whenever they take place as mere shows.
The approach I am making for the solution of the Communal Problem is therefore based upon two considerations :
(1 ) That in proceeding to solve the Communal Problem it is essential to define the governing principles which should be invoked for determining the final solution, and
(2) That whatever the governing principles they must be applied to all parties equally without fear or favour.
Proposals for Solution of the Communal Problem
Having made my position clear on certain preliminary points, I will now proceed to deal with the subject.
The Communal Problem raises three questions:
(A) The question of representation in the Legislature;
(B) The question of representation in the Executive; and
(C) The question of representation in the Services.
A. Representation in Public Services
To take the last question first. This can hardly be said to be a subject of controversy. The principle that all communities should be represented in the Public Services in a prescribed proportion and no single community should be allowed to have a monopoly has been accepted by the Government of India. This principle has been embodied in the Government of India Resolutions of 1934 and 1943 and rules to carry it out have been laid down. It has even prescribed that any appointment made contrary to the rules shall be deemed to be null and void. All that is necessary is to convert administrative practice into statutory obligation. This can be done by adding a Schedule to the Government of India Act, which will include the provisions contained in these Resolutions and similar provisions for the different provinces and make the Schedule a part of the Law of the Constitution.
B. Representation in the Executive
This question raises three points :
(i) The quantum of representation in the Executive ;
(ii) The nature of the Executive
(iii) The method of filling the places in the Executive.
(i) Quantum of Representation
For the solution of this question, the principle which should be adopted is that the representation of the Hindus, the Muslims and the Scheduled Castes should be equal to the quantum of their representation in the Legislature.
With regard. to the other minorities such as the Sikhs, Indian Christians and Anglo-Indians, it is difficult to give them representation in the Executive in strict proportion to their representation in the Legislature. This difficulty arises largely from the smallness of their numbers. If they are to go representation in the Executive in exact proportion to their numbers, the Executive would have to be enlarged to a fantastic degree. All that can be done, therefore is to reserve a seat or two for them in the Cabinet for their representation and to establish a convention that they will get a fair portion of representation in the corns of Parliamentary Secretaries that will have to be raised, when the new Constitution comes into existence.
C.Representation in the Legislature
This is the most difficult question. All other questions depend upon the solution of this question. It raises two points:
(i) The quantum of representation; and
(ii) The nature of the electorate.
(i) Quantum of Representation
I would first put forth my proposals and then explain the principles on which they are based.
Principles Underlying the Proposals
I may now proceed to state the principles on which the distribution has been made. They are
(1) Majority Rule is untenable in theory and unjustifiable in practice. A majority community may be conceded a relative majority of representation but it can never claim an absolute majority.*
*I have not framed any scheme of representation for the North-West Frontier province as the minority is so small that even the Principle of relative majority cannot help it.
(2) The relative majority of representation given to a majority community in the legislature should not be so large as to enable the majority to establish its rule with the help of the smallest minorities.
(3) The distribution of seats should be so made that a combination of the majority and one of the major minorities should not give the combine such a majority as to make them impervious to the interest of the minorities.
(4) The distribution should be so made that if all the minorities combine they could, without depending on the majority, form a government of their own.
(5) The weightage taken from the majority should be distributed among the minorities in inverse proportion to their social standing, economic position and educational condition so that a minority which is large and which has a better social, educational and economic standing gets a lesser amount of weightage than a minority whose numbers are less and whose educational, economic and social position is inferior to that of the others.
If I may say so, the representation is a balanced representation. No one community is placed in a position to dominate others by reason of its numbers. The Muslim objection to the Hindu majority and the Hindu and Sikh objections to the Muslim majority are completely eliminated, both in the Central as well as in the Provinces.
(to be continued)
Source: Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches Vol.1. published by Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1979
