Dhileepan Pakutharivu
The recent withholding of Tamil Nadu’s central share of Samagra Shiksha funds for rejecting the PM SHRI scheme and the National Education Policy (NEP 2020) underscores the increasing erosion of federalism in India.
The Union Education Minister’s assertion that State education funding depends on compliance with a national policy raises critical questions about constitutional governance, state autonomy and cooperative federalism.
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Federalism and the Indian Constitution
India’s federal structure is cooperative but has centralising tendencies for emergencies. The Constitution distributes powers between the Union and States under the Seventh Schedule, placing education in the Concurrent List. However, this does not grant the Union overriding authority. Cooperative federalism necessitates consultation and consensus, ensuring that state retain autonomy in critical governance areas, including education.
Central schemes like Samagra Shiksha are designed to supplement State efforts in education. The non-disbursal of Rs. 2,152 crore to Tamil Nadu, allegedly due to its rejection of PM SHRI and the three-language policy, reflects financial coercion. Tamil Nadu has adhered to a two-language policy since 1968, resisting the three-language formula due to its “historical” anti-Hindi stance. Therefore, imposing a uniform policy contradicts the State’s legislative authority and disrupts its established policy framework.
Conditional funding and Constitutional viability
The issue raises concerns about conditional grants by the Union to states. While financial assistance is responsibility, compelling States to adopt specific policies in areas where they hold constitutional competence is unconstitutional. In State of West Bengal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court emphasised,
“The Indian Constitution accepts the federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers between the coordinate constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the States.”
It further underscored that “the future stability of our vast country with its unity in diversity depends upon the strict adherence of the federal principle, which the fathers of our Constitution have so wisely and foresightedly incorporated therein.”
Similarly, in SR Bommai v. Union of India, the apex court further cemented this by declaring “federalism a basic feature,” immune to constitutional amendments.
Reinforcing this principle, the Madras High Court in Lakshmi School v. State of Tamil Nadu held that State governments have domain over all schools within their territory, including CBSE and ICSE schools. These rulings collectively avow that States are not mere administrative units, but enjoy constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.
The PM SHRI scheme, which mandates the study of three languages in schools, stands in direct contrast to Tamil Nadu’s long-established two-language policy, creating a potential conflict with the State’s education framework. Since the Constitution only grants Parliament supremacy over State laws in the Concurrent List through valid legislation, mere policy decisions cannot override the Autonomy of States. In this instance, financial exhortation to enforce uniformity only undermines federalism and democratic decentralisation.
Education and the role of States
Education, under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List, has traditionally been a domain where States exercised control until the dark age of the Emergency. The Right to Education Act, 2009, though enacted by Parliament, relies on substantial State involvement in implementation. States build schools, hire teachers and develop curricula. By linking Samagra Shiksha funding to the adoption of PM SHRI, the Centre disturbs this balance, intimidating Tamil Nadu into compliance rather than fostering cooperative governance.
Tamil Nadu’s education policy, rooted in its socio-linguistic and cultural identity, emphasises a two-language system of Tamil and English. The imposition of PM SHRI scheme or NEP 2020, which mandates a three-language policy, disregards the State laws in force. It is worth noting that even the Official Languages (Use for Official Purposes of the Union) Rules, 1976 is extended to the whole of India, except the State of Tamil Nadu.
Coercion or cooperation? The perils of centralised policymaking
The Constitution envisions cooperative federalism, granting States an equal stake in governance. However, recent trends indicate a shift toward “coercive federalism,” where financial dependence is leveraged as a tool for policy enforcement. This is evident in the reduction of GST shares, denial of disaster relief funds and withholding of State dues—practices increasingly used as political method, particularly against opposition-ruled States. Such an approach undermines democratic decentralization and the ethos of constitutional governance.
The Union Minister’s assertion that “Tamil Nadu has to come to the terms of the Constitution of India and that the three language policy is the rule of law,” perturbs federal equilibrium. The compliance of States with constitutional provisions does not equate to subordination to Union policies. Article 246, read with Entry 25 of List III, grants States the right to frame education policies, provided they align with constitutional mandates. Furthermore, making Central grants contingent on national policy adoption risks violating federal principles and the doctrine of separation of powers.
A pragmatic approach:
Decentralisation and flexibility
A more balanced approach would de-link schemes like Samagra Shiksha from NEP mandates and instead base funding allocations on broader educational indicators such as literacy rates, gross enrollment ratios and infrastructure development. This would ensure States receive their rightful financial support. Discriminating against a State, however, amounts to rejecting the very Constitution, which derives its legitimacy from the will of the people.
Targeting States like Tamil Nadu, which have consistently excelled in educational outcomes, by withholding funds under a mutually agreed scheme like Samagra Shiksha, risks undermining national interests and weakening India’s global educational standing. Tamil Nadu has successfully developed and implemented its own education policies, namely Samacheer Kalvi (equitable education), as viable alternatives to NEP, ensuring continuity, stability and inclusivity across higher education and research institutions.
The Constitution safeguards diversity in governance rather than imposing uniformity. Undermining this balance through financial duress sets a dangerous precedent that could extend to other domains, eroding constitutional values. Thus, the Union government must champion decentralised policies that drive progress and nurture a spirit of scientific inquiry in education.
Conclusion
The Union government’s attempt to condition financial grants upon policy adoption contradicts cooperative federalism and raises serious constitutional concerns. Education policies should be formulated through dialogue and mutual respect for the Autonomy of States, rather than enforced through financial arm-twisting. For India to uphold its federal character, decentralisation and flexibility in policy implementation must take precedence. Ultimately, federalism in India is not merely an administrative mechanism, but a fundamental constitutional principle that reflects the essence of unity in diversity, defining the very idea of India.
Courtesy: ‘Bar and Bench’
dated 13th March 2025
