The following was the presentation made by Babasaheb Dr.B.R. Ambedkar before Simon Commission in British India in 1929.
Under the existing constitution the Governor of a Province does not occupy a well-defined position. He has not the position of a constitutional head representing the Crown in the Province without any responsibility for the government of the Province. Nor is his position such as to invest him with a complete direction of the affairs of the Province. His position partakes of both. Such a position for the Governor which makes him play the double role of an autocrat and a constitutional head is not a very happy position either from the standpoint of the Governor or from the standpoint of smooth working of the governmental machine. Whatever the nature of the difficulties of the position of a Governor was made to occupy it was quite consistent with the type of the constitution that was introduced in 1919.
As the constitution did not grant full responsible government the Governor was naturally not reduced to the position of a constitutional head. On the other hand, as the direction of the affairs of the Provinces was in some departments at any rate, transferred to responsible ministers, the Governor was not permitted to retain his former position as an irresponsible head. The change in the position of the Governor was thus based on an intelligent principle of reducing the executive powers of the Governor in direct ratio to the advance made towards responsible government. Following the logic of the principle laid down in 1919, of making the position of the Governor to accord with the transfer of responsibility, I recommend that the Governor of the Province should be reduced to the position of a constitutional head. Indeed no other position for the Governor can be thought of, which will be compatible with the system of full responsible government.
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Regarding his powers he shall have in his capacity as representing the Crown in the Executive of the Province the power to make appointments to the Cabinet. In the same capacity, he will have the ultimate power of giving or refusing sanction, to any order proposed by the minister in any matter pertaining to any branch of the administration. As presenting the Crown in the Legislature he will have in dealing with Bills passed by the Council the power (1) to assent, (2) to reserve assent pending signification of His Majesty’s pleasure and (3) to refuse assent.
The exercise of these powers given to the Governor must of course be made conditional upon the formula that it must be with the advice of ministers responsible to the Legislature. This does not mean that he will not have the discretion to disagree with his ministers. Far from that being the case, he will retain the liberty not merely to tell his ministers that he does not approve of their policy but actually to dismiss the ministers who persist in a policy to which he is opposed. For there cannot be any obligation on a constitutional head compelling him to follow a minister responsible to a Legislature.
The essence of his obligation is to follow the general wish of the electors and if he appears to follow the minister it is because a minister is supposed to represent the will of the electors. But there may be occasions when he may have reasons to doubt that the minister correctly represents the will of the general electorates. Consequently not only do the constitutions of all responsible governments recognise this possibility but they actually provide him with all possible means of ascertaining what the will of the electorates is.
For that purpose the constitution of every responsible government permits the Governor to dismiss the ministers and appoint others who agree with him in the hope that the Legislature will support them. If the Legislature refuses support to the new ministers, the constitutions of all responsible governments permit him another resource that of an appeal to the electorates in the hope that they might support him. These resources the Governor of the Province must be allowed. But it is also necessary to bear in mind that no constitution gives him larger powers than these. If after the ascertainment of the will of electorates, it is found that the decision has gone against him the constitution of every responsible government leaves him no other alternative but to yield, abdicate or fight. The Governor of a Province must be content with these resources.
Under no circumstances can he have independent powers of action such as he has under the present constitution to certify measure not passed by the Legislature, sanction expenditure refused by the legislature or suspend the constitution by dismissing the ministers and assuming the direction of affairs himself. What is necessary therefore for making the Governor a constitutional head is to take away his powers of certification and suspension and thus make it impossible for him to act independently of ministers responsible to the Legislature?
The precise language of the Section in which the obligation of the Governor to act on the advice of the minister is a matter of some moment. Section 52(3) which deals with this seem to be too vaguely worded. It is too indefinitely worded to secure the desired end. Instead of stating that the Governor shall act on the advice of his ministers it would be better if the Section stated that no order of the Governor shall be valid unless it is countersigned by minister. The obligatory force of such language is obvious. Accordingly I recommend such a change in the language of the Section.
Along with the definition of the powers of the Governor, the place of the Governor in the Executive must also be defined. Being relieved from the responsibility for the direction of affairs the function of the Governor becomes supervisory rather than executive. His main business will be to see that those on whom the responsibility will now fall do not infringe the principles enunciated in the constitution for their guidance. In order that he may perform this function, he must be independent of local politics. That independence is absolutely essential to unprejudicial supervision.
The best way of keeping him independent is to keep him away him away from the executive. Nothing will undermine public confidence in his impartial judgment so much as a direct participation by the Governor in political controversies – Nor can it be doubted that his association in the public mind with the controversies between the Legislature and the Executive will have any other result. If the Governor is to discharge his functions in a manner that will be regarded as fair it is very important that they must be above party. For that purpose he must be emancipated from the Executive as he has been dissociated from the Legislature. I therefore recommend that it should be provided that the Governor shall not be a part of the Executive nor shall be have the right to preside over it. The meetings of the Executive shall be summoned and presided over by the Prime Minister without any intervention of the Governor.
Source: ‘Dr.Babasaheb Ambedkar Writings and Speeches’, Volume 2, Page: 334 – 336.
