K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty, IAS (Retd)
Former Vice Chancellor of
Indian Maritime University
Six of Tamil Nadu’s State universities are at present without a Vice Chancellor (VC). Some of these posts have been vacant from a few months to over a year. This impasse is due to a disagreement between the Governor and the State government regarding the composition of the search committee for selecting VCs.
The Governor (as ex-officio Chancellor of State universities under the University Acts) insists on including a nominee of the University Grants Commission (UGC) in the search committee as per Regulation 7.3 of the UGC Regulations, 2018. Conversely, the State government insists on adhering to the respective State University Acts, which generally require the search committee to consist of one nominee each from the Chancellor, the Syndicate, and the Senate. It opposes UGC involvement due to concerns over erosion of State autonomy in university governance.
Conflicting Supreme Court rulings have complicated the situation. One set of judgments support the Governor’s stance that UGC regulations are mandatory and can override the State University Acts in cases of conflict. Another set of judgments back the State government, holding that UGC regulations are merely recommendatory for State universities. The controversy has been exacerbated by the UGC’s Draft Regulations, 2025 which are seen to erode State autonomy further.
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There is a somewhat similar stand-off in Kerala and Punjab where numerous universities also face leadership vacuums. This has led to serious deterioration in university administration, including delays in staff appointments and award of degrees.
A constitutional question
UGC regulations are a subordinate legislation framed under Section 26 of the UGC Act, 1956. The crux of the dispute is whether UGC regulations framed by the UGC’s Chairman, Vice-Chairman and 10 other members can supersede provisions of State University Acts which are plenary laws passed by State legislatures and assented to by the Governor or President. This is part of a larger question of law dealing with Centre-State relations — “can delegated legislation (rules, regulations, notifications, etc.) framed by the Union Government and its agencies under a Central law override the provisions of a plenary State law?”
It underlines a critical constitutional issue regarding the scope of delegated legislation with potential for eroding the separation of powers, and federalism — both considered ‘basic features’ of the Constitution.
Judicial precedents
Article 254(1) of the Constitution addresses conflicts between Central and State laws. It states that if a State law is repugnant to a Central law on matters in the Concurrent List, the Central law will prevail, and the conflicting part of the State law will be void. The plain wording of Article 254(1) indicates that it applies only to plenary laws enacted by Parliament and State legislatures, and not to delegated legislation. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld this interpretation in several landmark judgments.
The leading case on the subject is Ch. Tika Ramji versus State of Uttar Pradesh (1956). The Supreme Court ruled that the Centre’s Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, could not repeal the provisions of the U.P. Sugarcane Act, 1953. It held: “The power of repeal, if any, was vested in Parliament, and Parliament alone could exercise it by enacting an appropriate provision in regard thereto. Parliament could not delegate this power of repeal to any executive authority. Such delegation, if made, would be void…”
In Indian Express newspapers (Bombay) versus Union of India (1984), the Supreme Court ruled: “Subordinate legislation may be questioned on any of the grounds on which plenary legislation is questioned. In addition, it may also be questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the statute under which it is made. It may further be questioned on the ground that it is contrary to some other statute. That is because subordinate legislation must yield to plenary legislation.” In J.K. Industries versus Union of India (2007), the Supreme Court again ruled: “(Subordinate legislation) may further be questioned on the ground that it is inconsistent with the provisions of the Act or that it is contrary to some other statute applicable on the same subject matter. Therefore, it has to yield to plenary legislation.” These rulings make it clear that the Central Government and its agencies cannot use subordinate legislation to override plenary State laws; any changes require a plenary central law passed by Parliament.
An overreach by the UGC
There is no repugnancy between the provisions of the UGC Act, 1956 and Tamil Nadu’s University Acts because no provision of the UGC Act addresses the appointment of VCs. According to the UGC, its power to form Regulation 7.3 relating to VCs is derived from Section 26(1)(e), which allows the UGC to define qualifications for university teaching staff, and Section 26(1)(g), which permits regulation of standards and coordination of work or facilities in universities, of the UGC Act, 1956. But the VC is not a ‘teaching staff’ within the meaning of S.26(1)(e). In all University Acts — Central and State — the VC is an “officer of the university” along with the Chancellor, Registrar, Controller of Examinations, Finance Officer and Directors. So, the above two provisions do not apply to VCs.
Moreover, the UGC’s powers under Section 12(d) of the Act are only recommendatory. While the UGC can advise on standards in higher education, it cannot enforce compliance, except by withholding grants under Section 14. The Supreme Court has affirmed this interpretation in University of Delhi versus Raj Singh (1994), ruling that UGC regulations are advisory, not mandatory. Universities can choose whether or not to follow them, albeit at the risk of losing funding. Thus, UGC’s regulation 7.3 on VCs is a classic case of executive overreach in delegated legislation and is ultra vires the UGC Act, 1956.
Additionally, the UGC’s shifting stance — no regulation on VCs till 2010; introducing a UGC nominee on the search committee in 2010; withdrawing this requirement in 2013; reinstating it in 2018; and expanded control in the 2025 draft regulations — reflects an agenda driven more by administrative control than a genuine effort to improve academic standards.
Inconsistencies in judgments
Recently, some conflicting Supreme Court judgments have created confusion.
In Annamalai University versus Secretary, Information & Tourism (2009), State of West Bengal versus Anindya Sundar Das (2022), Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi versus State of Gujarat (2022) and Professor Sreejith P.S. versus Dr. Rajasree M.S. (2022), the Supreme Court held, without articulating reasons, that once UGC regulations are laid before both Houses of Parliament, they become part of the UGC Act, invoking Article 254(1) and rendering any VC appointments contrary to these regulations void.
However, in Kalyani Mathivanan versus K.V.Jeyaraj (2015), the Supreme Court used the same rationale but confusingly ruled that UGC Regulations are not mandatory for State Universities unless adopted by the State. In P.J. Dharmaraj versus Church of South India (December 2024), the Supreme Court held: “If the State Government itself has not adopted the amended regulations, the same cannot be applicable to the (institute).” In other words, UGC regulations apply only if adopted by the State.
The interpretation that UGC regulations lose their subordinate character and automatically become part of the parent Act merely by being laid before Parliament is not supported by the Constitution or the General Clauses Act, 1897. It contravenes a significant precedent ruled in Chief Inspector of Mines versus Karam Chand Thapar (1961) where the Supreme Court held: “(Rules) continue to be rules subordinate to the Act, and though for certain purposes, including the purpose of construction, they are to be treated as if contained in the Act, their true nature as subordinate rule is not lost.” In other words, they retain their character as subordinate legislation and do not become integral to the parent Act.
There are three recognised procedures for laying subordinate legislation before a legislature— (i) without further procedure; here the subordinate legislation takes effect immediately and is for information only: (ii) negative resolution procedure; here legislation takes effect immediately but can be annulled or modified by the legislature within a limited period (as in the case of UGC regulations under Section 28(1)): (iii) affirmative resolution procedure; here resolution takes effect only after receiving prior approval from the legislature.
Courts should recognise only rules and regulations laid under the affirmative resolution procedure as part of the parent Act, because the other two procedures have nil or limited legislative oversight and allow executive overreach.
What next?
Given the constitutional significance of the dispute and doctrinal ambiguities, a definitive ruling by a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court is imperative. Such a ruling would hopefully reaffirm that Article 254(1) of the Constitution applies only to conflicts between plenary Central and State laws; clarify that delegated legislation does not automatically become part of the parent Act unless laid under the affirmative resolution procedure; and emphasise the advisory nature of UGC regulations for State universities unless adopted by the State.
Such clarity is essential not only to restore the normal functioning of State universities across the country, but also to preserve the delicate balance of legislative powers between the Centre and States.
Courtesy: The Hindu
